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Abstract - Blaster worm of 2003 is still persistent, the infection 
appears to have successfully transitioned to new hosts as the 
original systems are cleaned or shut off, suggesting that the 
Blaster worm, and other similar worms, will remain significant 
Internet threats for many years after their initial release.  This 
paper is to propose technique on tracing the Blaster attack 
from various logs in different OSI layers based on fingerprint 
of Blaster attack on victim logs, attacker logs and IDS alert log.  
The researchers intended to do a preliminary investigation 
upon this particular attack so that it can be used for further 
research in alert correlation and computer forensic 
investigation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Blaster worm of 2003 infected at least 100,000 
Microsoft Windows systems and cost millions in damage. In 
spite of cleanup efforts, an antiworm, and a removal tool 
from Microsoft, the worm persists [1]. According to [2], 
research on Blaster attack is significant due to the multitude 
of malware such as Blaster worm has itself evolved into a 
complex environment and has potential for reinfection by 
either itself or another worm, to occur using the same 
exploit.  
 
Recent tools targeted at eradicating it appear to have had 
little effect on the global population. In the persistent 
population analysis, the infection appears to have 
successfully transitioned to new hosts as the original 
systems are cleaned or shut off, suggesting that the Blaster 
worm, and other similar worms, will remain significant 
Internet threats for many years after their initial release and 
its suggested that the Blaster worm is not going away 
anytime soon.  Therefore, the objective of this paper is to 
propose technique on tracing the Blaster attack from various 
logs in different OSI layers.  The researchers intended to do 
a preliminary investigation upon this particular attack so that 
it can be used for further research in alert correlation and 
computer forensic investigation. 
  
 
 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
 
W32.Blaster.Worm is a worm that exploits the DCOM 
RPC vulnerability (described in Microsoft Security Bulletin 
MS03-026) using TCP port 135. If a connection attempt to 
TCP port 135 is successful, the worm sends an RPC bind 
command and an RPC request command containing the 
buffer overflow and exploit code. The exploit opens a 
backdoor on TCP port 4444, which waits for further 
commands. The infecting system then issues a command to 
the newly infected system to transfer the worm binary using 
Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) on UDP port 69 from 
the infecting system and execute it.  
 
The worm targets only Windows 2000 and Windows 
XP machines. While Windows NT and Windows 2003 
Server machines are vulnerable to the aforementioned 
exploit (if not properly patched), the worm is not coded to 
replicate to those systems. This worm attempts to download 
the msblast.exe file to the %WinDir%\system32 directory 
and then execute it.   
 
The Blaster worm’s impact was not limited to a short 
period in August 2003. According to [3], a published survey 
of 19 research universities showed that each spent an 
average of US$299,579 during a five-week period to 
recover from the Blaster worm and its variants.  The cost of 
this cleanup effort has helped solidify a growing view of 
worms not as acts of Internet vandalism but as serious 
crimes. Although the original Blaster.A author was never 
caught, authors of several other variants have been 
apprehended. 
 
There are various research techniques done by others 
researcher in detecting attack. It can either use signature-
based, anomaly-based or specification-based.  The 
signature-based as described by [4] will maintain the 
database of known intrusion technique and detects intrusion 
by comparing behaviour against the database whereas the 
anomaly-based detection techniques will analyses user 
behaviour and the statistics of a process in normal situation, 
and it checks whether the system is being used in a different 
manner. [5] has described that this technique can overcome 
misuse detection problem by focusing on normal system 
behaviour rather than attack behaviour.  The specification-
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based detection according to [6] will rely on program 
specifications that describe the intended behaviour of 
security-critical programs.  The research trend for detecting 
attack has move towards combination or hybrid of either 
signature-based with anomaly-based done by [7], [8] and [5] 
or specification-based with anomaly-based done by [9]. 
 
For the purpose of this preliminary experiment, the 
researchers have selected only signature-based detection 
technique and in future, intend to combine it with anomaly-
based detection technique for further improvement of 
tracing attack. 
 
System log files contain valuable evidence pertaining to 
computer attacks.  However, the log files are often massive, 
and much of the information they contain is not relevant to 
the network administrator. Furthermore, the files almost 
always have a flat structure, which limits the ability to query 
them. Thus, it is extremely difficult and time consuming to 
extract and analyse the trace of attacks from log files [10]. 
This paper will select the most valuable attributes from a log 
file that is relevance to the attack being traced. Our research 
is preliminary experiment of tracing the Blaster.B attack in 
diverse log resources to provide more complete coverage of 
the attack space [11]. 
 
According to [12], the network attack analysis process 
involves three main procedures: initial response, media 
imaging duplication, and imaged media analysis. Our 
proposed approach focuses on the procedure of media 
imaging duplication and imaged media analysis. This paper 
describes how procedure can be applied to the numerous 
logs, which can derive the top facts in each of the diverse 
connections and locate malicious events spread across the 
network. 
 
III. EXPERIMENT APPROACH 
 
Our proposed approach in this preliminary experiment 
used four methods: Network Environment Setup, Attack 
Activation, Log Collection and Log Analysis and its 
depicted in Figure 1. The details of the method are discussed 
in the following sub-section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Method use in the preliminary experiment 
A. Network Environment Setup 
 
The network setup for this experiment will refer to the 
network simulation setup [13] done by the MIT Lincoln Lab 
and it has been slightly modified using only Centos and 
Windows XP compared to MIT Lincoln Lab which using 
Linux, Windows NT, SunOS, Solaris, MacOS and Win98 to 
suit our experiment’s environment.  The network design is 
as shown below in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2: Preliminary Network Design for Blaster Attack Simulation 
 
This network design consists of two switches 
configured to Vlan 3 (192.168.3.0) and Vlan 2 
(192.168.2.0), one router, two servers for Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) and Network Time Protocol (NTP) 
run on Centos 4.0, two victims run on Windows XP on each 
Vlan and one attacker run on Vlan 2.  The log files that 
expected to be analysed are four types of log files (personal 
firewall log, security log, system log and application log) 
that shall be generated by host level device and one log files 
by network level device (alert log by IDS).  Ethereal 0.10.7 
[6] were installed in each host to verify the traffic between 
particular host and other device and tcpdump script is 
activated in IDS to capture the traffic for the whole traffic 
within Vlan 2 and Vlan 3. 
 
B.  Attack Activation 
 
Event viewer and time synchronisation using NTP 
server is configured before attack is launched.  Then Blaster 
variant is installed and activated on the attacker machine.  
This experiment runs for 30 minutes.  Once the victim 
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machine is successfully infected by the Blaster, the 
experiment is terminated. 
 
C. Log Collection 
 
Log is collected at two different OSI layers which are 
application layer and network layer.  Each victim and 
attacker machine will generated personal firewall log, 
security log, application log, system log and ethereal log. 
The IDS machine will generate alert log and tcpdump log. 
Ethereal and tcpdump files are used to verify the simulation 
attack and compare it with the others log files. For the 
purpose of this paper, both verification logs are not 
discussed due to limited page.  The summary of the various 
log files generated is as shown in Table I. 
 
TABLE I. Various log files generated from two different OSI layers 
 
 
 
 
C. Log Analysis 
 
In this network attack analysis process the researchers 
has implement the media imaging duplication using IDS and 
imaged media analysis by analysing logs generated in Table 
1. The objective of the log analysis is to identify the Blaster 
attack by observing the specific characteristics of the Blaster 
attack which exploits the DCOM RPC vulnerability using 
TCP port 135. This worm attempts to download the 
msblast.exe file to the %WinDir%\system32 directory and 
then execute it. The exploit opens a backdoor on TCP port 
4444, which waits for further commands. In this analysis, 
the researchers have selected the valuable attributes that is 
significance to the attack being traced as shown in Table II. 
 
 
 
TABLE II. Selected Log Attribute 
 
Log filenames Selected Log Attribute Variable 
pfirewall.log • Source IP address  
• Destination IP 
Address 
• Destination port  
• Source port  
• Action  
• Date  
• Time  
 
• SrcIP 
• DstIP 
 
• Dstport 
• Srcport 
• Act 
• D 
• T 
security.evt • Date  
• Time  
• Category  
• D 
• T 
• Cat 
application.evt 
system.evt 
alert.log • Date  
• Time 
• Source IP address  
• Destination IP 
Address 
• Category 
• D 
• T 
• SrcIP 
• DstIP 
 
• Cat 
 
 
IV. PROPOSED TRACING TECHNIQUE 
 
In order to identify the attacker, the researchers have 
proposed a tracing technique as depicted in Figure 3, 
consists of three elements: victim, attacker and IDS.  The 
algorithm used in each element will be elaborated in the 
next sub-section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Proposed Tracing Technique 
 
A. Tracing Algorithm for Victim logs 
 
In our tracing procedure, the tracing activity will be 
primarily done at victim site by examining the Blaster 
fingerprint for victim logs as shown in Figure 4.  These 
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Blaster fingerprint is derived from several studies done by 
[14], [15], [16]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Fingerprint of Blaster attack in each selected victim logs 
 
In this analysis, the researchers have specified 
192.168.3.13 as one of the victim and 192.168.2.150 as 
attacker (refer to Figure 2). The tracing tasks are initially 
started at the victim personal firewall log followed by 
security log, system log and application log. The data can be 
further analysed by referring to Blaster fingerprint for 
attacker logs by examine the attacker personal firewall and 
security log. Figure 6, 9 and 12 is the relevant information 
that has been extracted from selected logs. 
 
Figure 5 shows the tracing algorithm for each selected 
victim logs based on Blaster attack fingerprint as in Figure 
4. 
 
The aim of these tracing tasks is to examine the trace 
left by the Blaster in the selected log.  The trace is based on 
the Blaster attack fingerprint which primarily done at 
personal firewall log.  In these tracing tasks, the researchers 
have manipulated the attributes selected in Table II.  The 
searching start with the victim IP address is 192.168.3.13, 
and the action is OPEN-BOUNDED which show the 
attacker is trying to open the connection. The protocol used 
is TCP and the destination port is 135 which show that 
Blaster attack attempt to establish connection. 
 
 
Where, 
x = Victim Host 
y = Attacker Host 
 
Victim Personal firewall log tracing algorithm 
Input Action, Protocol, Destination Port 
If (Action = Open-Inbound) and (Protocol = TCP) 
and (Destination Port = 135) 
 Date = DFW x 
Time = TFW1 x  
Source IP = SrcIPx 
Destination IP = DestIPx 
    Source Port = SrcPortax 
Print Source IP, Date, Time, Source Port, 
Destination IP, Action, Protocol, Destination 
Port 
If (Action = Open) and (Protocol = TCP) and 
(Destination Port = 4444) and (Date = DFW x) 
and (Time >= TFW1 x) and  
(Source IP = SrcIPx) and (Destination IP = 
DestIPx) 
 Time = TFW2 x 
 Source Port = SrcPortex 
 Print Source IP, Date, Time, Source 
Port, Destination IP, Action, Protocol, 
Destination Port 
End 
End 
 
Victim Security log tracing algorithm 
Input Date (DFW x) 
Input Time (TFW2 x) 
Input AuditCategory 
If (Date = DFWx) and (Time >= TFW2x) and 
(AuditCategory = ‘\system32\svchost.exe, 
generated an application error’) 
 Time = TAppl x 
 Date = DAppl x 
 Print Time, Date, AuditCategory 
End 
 
Victim System log tracing algorithm 
Input Date (DAppl x) 
Input Time (TAppl x) 
Input AuditCategory 
If (Date = DAppl x) and (Time >= TAppl x) and 
(AuditCategory = ‘The Remote Procedure Call 
(RPC) service terminated unexpectedly’) 
  Time = TimeSys x 
 Date = DateSys x 
 Print Time, Date, AuditCategory 
End  
 
Victim Application log tracing algorithm 
Input Date (DSys x) 
Input Time (TSys x) 
Input AuditCategory 
If (Date = DSys x) and (Time >= TSys x) and 
(AuditCategory = ‘Windows is shutting down’) 
  Time = TimeSec x 
 Date = DateSec x 
 Print Time, Date, AuditCategory 
End  
 
Figure 5: Tracing algorithm for Victim logs 
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Victim Personal firewall log 
2009-05-07 14:13:34 OPEN-INBOUND TCP 192.168.2.150 
192.168.3.13 3284 135 - - - - - - - - 
2009-05-07 14:14:01 DROP TCP 192.168.2.150 
192.168.3.13 3297 4444 48 S 862402054 0 64240 - 
- - 
 
Victim Security log 
5/7/2009 2:20:03 PM Security
 Success Audit System Event  513 NT 
AUTHORITY\SYSTEM AYU Windows is shutting 
down. All logon sessions will be terminated by 
this shutdown. 
 
Victim System log 
5/7/2009 2:19:00 PM Service Control 
Manager Error None 7031 N/A AYU
 The Remote Procedure Call (RPC) service 
terminated unexpectedly.  It has done this 1 
time(s).  The following corrective action will 
be taken in 60000 milliseconds: Reboot the 
machine. 
5/7/2009 2:19:00 PM USER32 Information
 None 1074 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM AYU
 The process winlogon.exe has initiated the 
restart of AYU for the following reason: No 
title for this reason could be found 
 Minor Reason: 0xff 
 Shutdown Type: reboot 
 Comment: Windows must now restart because the 
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) service terminated 
unexpectedly 
 
Victim Application log 
5/7/2009 2:20:01 PM EventSystem Error
 (50) 4609 N/A AYU The COM+ 
Event System detected a bad return code during 
its internal processing.  HRESULT was 800706BA 
from line 44 of 
d:\nt\com\com1x\src\events\tier1\eventsystemobj
.cpp.  Please contact Microsoft Product Support 
Services to report this error. 
5/7/2009 2:19:00 PM DrWatson
 Information None 4097 N/A AYU
 The application, 
C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe, generated an 
application error The error occurred on 
05/07/2009 @ 14:19:00.441 The exception 
generated was c0000005 at address 0018759F 
(<nosymbols>) 
5/7/2009 2:14:00 PM Application Error
 Error (100) 1000 N/A AYU
 Faulting application svchost.exe, version 
5.1.2600.0, faulting module unknown, version 
0.0.0.0, fault address 0x00000000. 
5/7/2009 2:20:03 PM EventLog
 Information None 6006 N/A AYU
 The Event log service was stopped. 
 
Figure 6: Extracted data from Victim logs 
 
From these trace, the source IP address (SrcIPx) and 
source port of potential attacker is known where source IP 
address is 192.168.2.150, source port (SrcPortax) is 3824 and 
the date and time is 2009-05-07 14:13:34 also known to 
shows when the attack is happen. 
 
Subsequently, to trace whether the attack was exploited, 
the log is further search on the same date and time within 
the range of the Blaster attack attempt to establish 
connection.  The destination IP address (DestIPx) is victim 
IP address, the source IP address (SrcIPx) is the potential 
attacker IP address, the action is DROP, protocol used is 
TCP and destination port is 4444.  From this trace, the 
potential attacker source port is known and it indicates that 
the Blaster is exploited using port 4444.  This attack can be 
further verified by examining the personal firewall log at 
the machine of the potential attacker. 
 
To support the information obtained in personal 
firewall log, further investigation done in the security log, 
system log and application log.  The effect of the 
exploitation can be traced by looking at the message 
embedded in the application log, system log and security log 
which shows message 
“C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe, generated an 
application error”, “Windows must now restart because the 
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) service terminated 
unexpectedly” and “Windows is shutting down. All logon 
sessions will be terminated by this shutdown” respectively. 
All of these messages shown the effect of Blaster attack, 
which it exploits the RPC services.  The highlighted data in 
Figure 6 is extracted by using the tracing algorithm in 
Figure 5 accordingly. 
 
B. Tracing Algorithm for Attacker logs 
 
The tracing algorithm for tracing the attacker logs in 
Figure 8 is based on Blaster attack fingerprint in Figure 7. 
The same tracing step in victim logs is used in investigating 
the attacker logs.  The only difference is the action is OPEN 
and extra information obtained from previous tracing tasks: 
source port (SrcPortax), date (DFWx) and time (TFW1x) is used 
to verify the existence of communications between attacker 
and victim machine on port 135. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Fingerprint of Blaster attack in each selected attacker log 
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Then, to verify that there is an exploitation done by 
attacker to victim machine, the main attributes used in the 
personal firewall log are destination IP address, action is 
OPEN, protocol is TCP, destination port is 4444, source port 
(SrcPortex), date (DFWx) and time (TFW2y).  
 
To validate the information obtained in the attacker personal 
firewall log, further analysis done in the security log, system 
log and application log.  The process created is found in the 
security log with the message “A new process has been 
created and the Image File Name: C:\Documents and 
Settings\aminah\Desktop\Blaster.exe”. 
 
Where, 
x = Victim Host 
y = Attacker Host 
Attacker Personal firewall log tracing algorithm 
Input Action, Protocol, Destination Port 
Input Date (obtained from tracing victim log, 
DFW x) 
Input Time (obtained from firewall victim log, 
TFW1 x) 
Input Source IP (obtained from firewall victim 
log, SrcIPx) 
Input Destination IP (obtained from firewall 
victim log, DestIPx) 
Input Source Port to attempt attack (obtained 
from firewall victim log, SrcPortax) 
Input Source Port to exploit attack (obtained 
from firewall victim log, SrcPortex) 
If (Action = Open) and (Protocol = TCP) and 
(Destination Port = 135) and (Date = DFWx) 
and(Time <= TFW1 x) and (Source IP = SrcIPx) 
and (Destination IP = DestIPx) and (Source 
Port = SrcPortax) 
  Time = TFW1y 
  Date = DFWy 
Print Source IP, Destination IP, Date, 
Time, Source Port, Destination Port, 
Protocol, Action 
If (Action = Open) and (Protocol = TCP) and 
(Destination Port = 4444) and (Date = DFWy) 
and (Time >= TFW1y) and (Source IP = SrcIPx) 
and (Destination IP = DestIPx) and (Source 
Port = SrcPortex) 
  Time = TFW2 y 
 Print Source IP, Date, Time, Source 
Port,  
Destination IP, Action, Protocol, 
Destination Port 
End 
End 
 
Attacker Security log tracing algorithm  
Input Date (DFWy) 
Input Time (TFW2y) 
Input AuditCategory 
 
If (Date = DFWy) and (Time >= TFW2y) and 
(AuditCategory = ‘Windows is shutting down’) 
   Time = TimeSec y 
  Date = DateSec y 
  Print Time, Date, AuditCategory 
End  
Figure 8: Tracing algorithm for Attacker logs 
The highlighted data in Figure 9 is extracted by using 
the tracing algorithm in Figure 8 accordingly.  
 
From the tracing, there is an evidence shows that the 
attack is launched by this attacker machine (192.168.2.150) 
at 2009-05-07 14:13:33 which is concurrent with the 
extracted data in Figure 6. Hence, the attacker can be 
identified using this tracing algorithm. 
 
 
Attacker Personal firewall log 
2009-05-07 14:13:33 OPEN TCP 192.168.2.150 192.168.3.12 
3283 135 - - - - - - - - 
2009-05-07 14:13:33 OPEN TCP 192.168.2.150 192.168.3.13 
3284 135 - - - - - - - - 
2009-05-07 14:13:33 OPEN TCP 192.168.2.150 192.168.3.14 
3285 135 - - - - - - - - 
2009-05-07 14:13:33 OPEN TCP 192.168.2.150 192.168.3.15 
3286 135 - - - - - - - - 
2009-05-07 14:13:35 OPEN TCP 192.168.2.150 192.168.3.12 
3296 4444 - - - - - - - - 
2009-05-07 14:13:56 OPEN TCP 192.168.2.150 192.168.3.13 
3297 4444 - - - - - - - - 
2009-05-07 14:14:11 CLOSE TCP 192.168.2.150 192.168.3.12 
3283 135 - - - - - - - - 
2009-05-07 14:14:11 CLOSE TCP 192.168.2.150 192.168.3.13 
3284 135 - - - - - - - - 
2009-05-07 14:14:11 CLOSE TCP 192.168.2.150 192.168.3.15 
3286 135 - - - - - - - - 
2009-05-07 14:15:11 CLOSE TCP 192.168.2.150 192.168.3.12 
3296 4444 - - - - - - - - 
2009-05-07 14:15:11 CLOSE TCP 192.168.2.150 192.168.3.13 
3297 4444 - - - - - - - - 
2009-05-07 14:15:11 CLOSE TCP 192.168.2.150 192.168.3.34 
3307 135 - - - - - - - - 
 
Attacker Security log 
5/7/2009 2:13:08 PM Security Success Audit
 Detailed Tracking  592 RAHAYU2\aminah
 RAHAYU2 "A new process has been created: 
  New Process ID: 1640 
  Image File Name: C:\Documents and 
Settings\aminah\Desktop\Blaster.exe 
  Creator Process ID: 844 
  User Name: aminah 
  Domain:  RAHAYU2 
  Logon ID:  (0x0,0x17744) 
 
Figure 9: Extracted data from Attacker logs 
 
C. Tracing Algorithm for IDS logs 
 
The Blaster attack fingerprint in Figure 10 is the base for 
tracing algorithm in IDS alert logs as depicted in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Fingerprint of Blaster attack in IDS log 
Blaster fingerprint 
at IDS Alert logs
Activity  
Portsweep 
(TCP 
portscan) 
Alarm 
Attacker 
IP 
address 
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To confirm that there is an exploitation done by attacker, 
extra information can be obtained from IDS alert log.  The 
main attributes used in the IDS alert log are date, time, 
Source IP Address and destination IP address.  If the 
destination IP address does not exist, the alert has generated 
false positive alert.  However, existence of source IP address 
is good enough to verify that this source IP address had 
launched an attack as reported as portsweep activity in IDS 
alert log shown in Figure 12. 
 
 
Input Date (obtained from victim firewall log,  
DFW x) 
Input Start Time (obtained from victim firewall 
log, TFW1x) 
Input End Time (obtained from victim firewall log, 
TFW2x) 
Input Source IP (obtained from victim firewall 
log, SrcIPx) 
Input Destination IP (obtained from victim 
firewall log, DestIPx) 
If (Date = DFW x) and (TFW1x =<Time>= TFW2x) and 
(Source IP = SrcIPx) and (Destination IP = 
DestIPx) 
Time = TIDS 
Print Date, Time, Source IP, Destination IP, 
Alert Message 
Else 
If (Date = DFW x) and (TFW1x =<Time>= TFW2x) and 
(Source IP = SrcIPx)  
 Time = TIDS 
 Print Date, Time, Source IP, Destination IP,  
Alert Message 
End 
End  
 
Figure 11: IDS tracing algorithm 
 
 
[**] [122:3:0] (portscan) TCP Portsweep [**] 
[Priority: 3] 
05/07-14:10:56.381141 192.168.2.150 -> 
192.168.3.1 
PROTO:255 TTL:0 TOS:0x0 ID:14719 IpLen:20 
DgmLen:158 
 
[**] [122:3:0] (portscan) TCP Portsweep [**] 
[Priority: 3] 
05/07-14:11:43.296733 192.168.2.150 -> 
192.168.3.34 
   PROTO:255 TTL:0 TOS:0x0 ID:0 IpLen:20 
DgmLen:162 DF 
 
Figure 12: Extracted data from IDS alert log 
 
The extracted data depicted from Figure 12, verified 
that the source IP address (192.168.2.150) is the attacker 
due to the port scanning alarm generated by the IDS. Thus, 
all the three tracing algorithm have the capability to identify 
the attacker. 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
In this study, the researchers have reviewed and 
analysed the Blaster attack from various logs in different 
OSI layers and researchers’ approach focuses on the 
procedure of media imaging duplication and imaged media 
analysis. Researchers have selected the most valuable 
attributes from the log files that are relevance to the attack 
being traced. From the analysis researcher has propose a 
technique on tracing the Blaster attack using specific tracing 
algorithm as in Figure 3 for each log which is based on 
fingerprint of Blaster attack on victim logs, attackers logs 
and IDS alert log.  This tracing technique is primarily used 
signature-based technique and later on the researchers 
intend to merge it with anomaly-based technique to improve 
the tracing capability.  All of these logs are interconnected 
from one log to another log to provide more complete 
coverage of the attack space information. Further 
improvement should be done on generalising the process of 
detecting the worm attack that will produce attack and trace 
pattern for alert correlation and computer forensic 
investigation research.  
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